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2026-01-22

VBS scripts masquerading as legitimate updates

Level: 
Tactical
  |  Source: 
Securonix
Global
Share:

How they get in: VBS scripts masquerading as legitimate updates

The attack starts with a user opening a VBS file dressed up as a software update or document. Once launched, the VBS loader starts a fully in-memory execution chain.

  • Initial Access TTPs seen
    • VBS scripts downloaded from 91.202.233[.]215/win64.vbs
      and executed via wscript.exe with //b //nologo to suppress UI.
    • Scripts land in user-writable locations: Desktop, Downloads, or %TEMP%—common drop zones for socially engineered malware.
    • On Error Resume Next is used to silently ignore errors and keep the script running.
  • VBS → PowerShell handoff
    • wscript.exe spawns powershell.exe with large inline command strings
    • The PowerShell payload is Base64-encoded with placeholder characters (%) that are replaced with C at runtime to evade static detection.
    • Execution uses -ExecutionPolicy Bypass to avoid both user prompts and policy controls.

Detection angle:
wscript.exe launching a vbs with//b //nologo or a PS from Desktop or %TEMP% with an abnormally high command line are your Stage 1 detection opportunities.

Text-based payload staging = the core innovation

Once PowerShell is running, it sets up a download mechanism that pulls payloads disguised as harmless text files. This is where SHADOW#REACTOR stands out: instead of obvious .exe or .dll files, everything arrives as .txt.

  • Architecture-aware downloads
      • PowerShell checks system architecture (32-bit vs 64-bit) and selects the matching payload:
      • 64-bit: qpwoe64.txt
      • 32-bit: qpwoe32.txt
      • Variants: teste32.txt, teste64.txt, config.txt

    What's Inside the Text Files?
  • Base64-encoded binary data (primarily .NET assemblies).
  • Assemblies protected with .NET Reactor obfuscation to resist reverse engineering and sandboxing.
  • PowerShell decodes, decompresses, and loads them directly into memory via [System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load()—no on-disk binary needed.

  • Network Communication Patterns
  • All downloads use System.Net.WebClient from PowerShell.
  • Traffic goes to 91.202.233[.]215 over HTTP.
  • Command lines feature literal HTTP URLs ending in .txt (an uncommon pattern that’s highly filterable.)
figure4

Persistence: script chains leading to MSBuild LOLBin execution

SHADOW#REACTOR maintains access using a sequence of scripts that hand control off across VBS and PowerShell, eventually invoking MSBuild.exe to run Remcos RAT.

Script chain pattern

In %TEMP%, you’ll see a progression like:

  • xx1.ps1 → executes and creates xx2.vbs
  • xx2.vbs → executes and triggers the next stage

This produces a consistent behavioral pattern:

  • Multiple scripts created and executed in a short window
  • Sequential naming in the same directory
  • Cross-language handoffs (PowerShell ↔ VBS)

MSBuild.exe: chosen LOLBin

  • MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is used as the final execution host, compiling/executing inline C# under a signed Microsoft binary.
  • Suspicious parents for MSBuild.exe:
    • Bad: powershell.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe
    • Expected: Visual Studio (devenv.exe), build servers, legitimate dev tools

File system footprint

  • Generic names such as Update32.exe and update.exe appear in:
    • %TEMP%
    • Desktop
    • Downloads
  • VBS files accumulate in user-writable paths, often with obfuscated or sequential names.

Net result:
Persistent execution via trusted Windows tooling, which can resemble normal developer activity unless you’re correlating parent-child processes and paths.

Screenshot 2026-01-16 at 6.32.33 PM

Detection priority themes

When mapping this campaign into the Anvilogic platform, we recommend prioritizing three detection stages that track the full chain:

Stage 1: Initial access & VBS execution

Focus on:

wscript.exe with //b //nologo executing VBS from Desktop, Downloads, or %TEMP%.

wscript.exe spawning powershell.exe with unusually long inline commands.

New VBS files dropped into user-writable locations and executed shortly after.

Covered by: AVL_UC135408, AVL_UC133321

Stage 2: PowerShell payload staging & text downloads

Target:

PowerShell started with -ExecutionPolicy Bypass from temporary/user directories.

Base64-heavy PowerShell command lines with non-standard character usage.

HTTP .txt URLs inside PowerShell command lines (http://*.txt).

System.Net.WebClient activity to 91.202.233[.]215.

Covered by: AVL_UC135067, AVL_UC1001, AVL_UC135391

Stage 3: Persistence & LOLBin execution

Watch for:

Sequential script creation and execution (e.g., xx1.ps1 → xx2.vbs) in %TEMP%.

MSBuild.exe launched from non-development parents (PowerShell, WScript, etc.).

Generic updater-style executables (Update32.exe, update.exe) in user-accessible folders.

Covered by: AVL_UC135204, AVL_UC135186

Threat scenarios: end-to-end coverage

We’ve chained these detections into three threat scenarios to cover the full SHADOW#REACTOR flow.

Scenario 1: Initial Access – Early-Stage Dropper Execution

VBS execution → PowerShell spawned → early obfuscation behavior

Screenshot 2026-01-16 at 6.15.39 PM
Initial Access - Early Stage Dropper Execution

Scenario 2: Payload Staging – Text-Based Downloads & Sequential Scripts

HTTP .txt downloads → script chain creation → persistence mechanisms

Screenshot 2026-01-16 at 6.11.20 PM-1
Payload Staging - Text-Based Download and Sequential Script Execution

Scenario 3: Late-Stage Execution – Script Chain to MSBuild LOLBin

Script-to-script handoffs → MSBuild.exe invocation → Remcos deployment

Screenshot 2026-01-16 at 6.17.49 PM
Script Chain Handoff to MSBuild LOLBin

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